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THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN MICROTARGETING: AN
EXAMINATION OF MODERN POLITICAL MESSAGING
LUKE BUNTING, BUTLER UNIVERSITY
MENTOR: MARGARET BRABANT
Abstract
The usage of targeted messaging by political campaigns has seen a drastic
evolution in the past fifty years. Through advancement in campaign technology and an increasingly large amount of personal information for sale to organizations willing to pay for it, campaigns have continually narrowed their
scope from targeting large demographic groups to targeting voters individually through a process called microtargeting. This paper examines the history
of microtargeting in American presidential campaigns, which has resulted in
a smaller, more polarized electorate.
1960 to 2000: A Narrowing of Focus
The usage of targeted messaging by political campaigns has seen a drastic
evolution in the past fifty years. Through advancement in campaign technology and an increasingly large amount of personal information for sale to organizations willing to pay for it, campaigns have continually narrowed their
scope from targeting large demographic groups to targeting voters individually through a process called microtargeting. Microtargeting, defined by journalist Steven Levy, is “a way to identify small but crucial groups of voters
who might be won over to a given side, and which messages would do the
trick” (Levy 2013). Microtargeting as we know it today finds its roots decades
before the modern iteration in the Republicans’ Southern Strategy of the
1960s.
During the 1960s, Republicans faced a new political reality: demographic shifts made winning in the South necessary to capture the presidency. The
1960 election saw presidential candidate Richard Nixon state that he believed in the Civil Rights Movement, a stance which put him at odds with
many Southern voters. When Nixon ran again in 1968 after his unsuccessful
try in 1960, his team looked at changing the candidate’s positions on certain
issues to sway voters in crucial states. This decision to tailor messaging in
order to specifically win white, Southern voters was referred to as the
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“Southern Strategy.” These white voters made up a large majority of the
states’ electorate due to lingering voting restrictions which prevented
African-Americans from casting a ballot, even in counties where they formed
a majority of the population. Southern white voters considered civil rights
legislation the most important issue of the campaign and in the 1968 election,
candidate Nixon suggested that some civil rights legislation was going too far
and perhaps should be repealed. This new framing of the issue won over persuadable voters in the South, as civil rights proved to be an issue which could
be used to cause a voter to cast a ballot against their affiliated party. These
issues are commonly referred to as wedge issues, as they are used to drive a
wedge between a voter and his or her party (Hillygus et al. 2008).
The Southern Strategy demonstrated one of the earliest large-scale efforts to target voters based upon personal data. In Nixon’s case, this targeting was very broad, simply categorizing voters as Northern or Southern. The
assumption was that all Southern states would be winnable if civil rights issues were stressed, due to the states’ restrictions on African-American voting
and the states’ general attitudes toward these issues. The effectiveness of this
approach pointed to the potential for grouping voters based upon demographics such as location and race.
Nixon’s successor, President Gerald Ford, realized the potential in narrowing campaign targeting. Ford faced a difficult reelection bid in 1976, in
part due to his pardoning of President Nixon. The Ford campaign decided to
take the targeting of voters slightly further, using polling data to determine
which issues would resonate with voters in more specific demographic subsets than just their state of residence. A memo from Ford campaign officials
discussed the necessity of appealing to female suburban voters, to whom environmental issues were proving to be of the utmost importance (Hillygus et
al. 2008). The memo suggests that President Ford begin to speak favorably
about environmental legislation and should make moves which would appease this group, but also warns that the president must not alienate working-class Republican voters who may see the legislation as threatening manufacturing jobs. This same memo also shed some light upon the shift away
from campaigning on racial issues, as polls demonstrated that voters did not
list it among their top concerns. Thus, focusing campaign time and resources
on racial issues would not prove effective in swaying many persuadable voters (Hillygus et al. 2008).
This targeting of general demographics continued through both the
1980s and the early 1990s, with little in the way of evolution. President Clinton began to lay the groundwork of modern microtargeting during his reelec-
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tion campaign in 1996 when the campaign divided potential voters based on
demographic data and sought to target messages specifically for each group.
The campaign further divided voters into nine categories based on their likely
political affiliation, with each grouping having charts demonstrating which
issues would resonate with them (Sosnik, et al 2006).
However, Clinton’s 1996 campaign became known for more than just a
new way of looking at demographic data. It was also the first presidential
campaign with well-documented usage of consumer data to help build voter
profiles. Until the 1996 presidential election cycle, messaging had targeted
voters based upon commonalities in their general demographic information,
e.g. marital status, ethnicity, and location. The idea was that even if some
individuals in these broad groups would not respond to certain messages, a
majority of those in the given group would. This kind of messaging was based
upon the general voting patterns of the demographics of each grouping. Hoping to utilize information more specific to each voter, the Clinton campaign
hired the firm Claritas, which specialized in collecting consumer data for corporate advertising. Firms such as Claritas would utilize a variety of methods
to obtain this information, such as purchasing lists of subscribers to magazines and conducting polls (Sosnik, et al 2006).
The data collected by this firm has been referred to as “lifestyle” data:
combining an overview of individuals’ purchasing habits and affiliations in
order to create a voter profile for each person. Clinton’s team merged this
lifestyle data with their political data to create a more complete file on each
likely voter. Joining with Claritas allowed the campaign to capitalize on demographic facts such as Democrats being heavier TV-watchers and late-night
television shows drawing a younger viewing audience. Using this data, the
campaign recognized that an appearance on late-night television would help
Clinton shore up support among younger liberal voters, spurring the campaign to arrange for Clinton to make several appearances on these programs
(Sosnik, et al 2006).
While lifestyle data had never been used before to this magnitude in a
presidential campaign, the political establishment had known for years that
there existed links between certain behaviors and voting preference. According to Eddie Mahe, a Republican consultant, the Republican National Committee began to run inquiries into voting behavior and consumer habits during the 1970s. One of the revelations from this research was the finding that
people who purchased Mercury automobiles were more likely to vote Republican than those who purchased any other kind of automobile (Gertner 2004).
However, parties were unable to utilize this data in a way which would help
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them win votes. While Clinton’s 1996 campaign began to utilize this data to
win over certain groups, the technology did not yet exist to fully capitalize on
its potential.
While the following presidential election in 2000 did not see advancements in the use of lifestyle data, it did mark the beginning of a new trend in
campaign targeting. While campaigns in the past had focused heavily on
winning over independents already likely to vote for their candidate, this
election saw a shift in that strategy. After eight years of the Clinton presidency, the electorate’s top four concerns going into the 2000 presidential election gave the Democrat candidate an advantage in three of them. The issues
of education, prescription drug costs, and Social Security reform were three of
the four most cited issues, and all three had Gore holding a lead over Bush in
the public’s confidence. This meant that a campaign on just the issues seen as
most important by the electorate would give Gore an advantage over Bush.
Only the issue of tax cuts saw George W. Bush holding an advantage over
Gore in the polling (Ceaser, Busch 2001).
The Bush campaign recognized that they would not be able to win running on the issues where Republicans held a lead over Democrats. Issues
where public polling indicated a Republican advantage were, for the most
part, not being cited as important issues during the 2000 election, making
campaigning on them inevitably ineffective. Instead, the Bush campaign formulated a plan to make inroads on the issues where Gore drew the most
strength. Labeling his ideology as “compassionate conservatism,” Bush
sought to win over likely Gore voters with his stance on one of the three issues, utilizing the lifestyle data of each voter to decide which of the issues
would be most effective (Ceaser, Busch 2001). Gore, on the other hand, had to
combat two major hurdles: 57% of Americans claiming that the country was
on the wrong moral track and 60% of Americans having an unfavorable view
of President Bill Clinton (Ceaser, Busch 2001). To combat these problems,
Gore broke with Clinton’s tone on the campaign trail, opting for a more populist message that contrasted with Clinton’s “Third Way” liberalism. The selection of Joe Lieberman as Gore’s pick for Vice-President continued Gore’s
movement away from the sitting President, as Lieberman was a moderate
with a history of criticizing Clinton. Lastly, Gore made sure that cameras
would catch him kissing his wife, a tactic to quell voters’ fears about more
infidelity in the White House. The uphill battles faced by both campaigns resulted in the closest election of the modern age, with Vice President Gore
winning the popular vote but losing the electoral vote to Bush based upon a
2000 Supreme Court decision in Bush v. Gore (Ceaser, Busch 2001)
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2004: The Synthesis of Data and Technology
The presidential election in 2004 is notable for the creation of modern-day
microtargeting, capitalizing on innovations in messaging technology. Both
the Republican George W. Bush and Democrat John Kerry campaigns sought
to amass a large number of demographic indicators for each voter, allowing
them to target messages for incredibly specific subsets of voters based upon
their gender, income, religious affiliation, and the lifestyle data provided by
consumer research firms. Much of this information was a result of the 1993
National Voter Registration Act, which allowed citizens to register to vote
when applying for a driver’s license. Access to registration information became even easier with the 2002 Help America Vote Act. This act was particularly helpful as it mandated the creation of a single national registry of all
registered voters (Hillygus et al. 2008). Having voter registration tied to driver’s license registration meant that all of the information required for the
license was also present on the voter registration file. This made a large
amount of personal demographic data available to political groups when they
purchased the voter registration files. Mirroring this increase in voter information was the amount of individual consumer information which was made
available to organizations. Data-gathering companies had become much more
commonplace for the express purpose of collecting and selling individuals’
consumer habits to campaigns. Lifestyle data was then used to supplement
information gained through the voter registration records (Sosnik, et al
2006).
By combining all of this available information, both the Republican and
Democratic parties managed to compile a comprehensive database containing
information on every American voter by 2004. Voter Vault became the name
for the Republicans’, while Datamart was the Democrats’ (Gertner 2004).
Profiles for the voters within the Datamart and Voter Vault systems could
contain hundreds of data points for a single person based off the information
collected. The hope was that by collecting information on voters as individuals, campaigns would be able to identify individuals whose voting patterns
differed from the general pattern of a demographic of which they were a part.
An example of this would be a potential Democratic voter living in a Republican household. Under previous methods, such a voter would have been labeled a likely-Republican and targeted as such. Once campaigns utilized microtargeting, having information on such a voter as an individual allowed
them to recognize his or her actual political leaning. In order to ensure success during the final months of the race, the Bush campaign sought out the
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membership lists of churches and other organizations during the first months
of 2004. Additionally, volunteers were recruited to canvass and interview
voters with the goal of adding this newly-acquired information into the databases (Gertner 2004).
While a large amount of data is beneficial in determining which voters
to target with which messages, new forms of political outreach have allowed
campaigns to better persuade voters. Recent studies have documented the
continuing decline in television ads’ effectiveness for election campaigns.
Considering the immense cost associated with these ads, many campaigns
have shifted focus to direct mail, canvassing, phone banks, social media, and
text messaging methods. Studies conducted on these new techniques have
demonstrated the effectiveness of both phone and face-to-face contact with
campaigns, suggesting that utilizing both can lead to a bump from 1 to 4
points in the final popular vote. It has also been found that face-to-face canvassing produces a stronger positive reaction than phone contact, but the latter’s effectiveness is still present (John, Brannan 2008).
Coming out of the 2000 national elections, the Republican Party recognized that superior grassroots organizing that took advantage of emerging
targeting techniques had allowed the Democrats to outperform their expected
turnout. Gearing up for the 2004 race, the Republicans aimed to expand their
own data collection and voter contact. Looking over voting patterns from the
previous election cycles, Bush strategists realized that the number of people
with independent voting records had shrunk from 16% in 1988 to 7% in 2002.
Voter targeting would have to shift focus to create new Republican voters in
states where the contest was bound to be close. Karl Rove, a Senior Advisor
for the Bush administration, crafted a plan for the campaign to find these
new voters in districts where demographic data suggested a large Republican
advantage. Once districts falling into this category were identified, the campaign would look for those which had seen Republican candidates underperform compared to demographic predictions. Those districts would be heavily
targeted, as the information suggested that while people in the district would
favor Republican candidates, there was a lack of political interest (Ceaser,
Busch 2001).
The Bush campaign began to analyze its data on voters and divided the
entire population into segments based on demographic data. Within each of
these segments, individuals were then ranked based on the likelihood that
they would vote and whether they would vote specifically for President Bush.
This allowed for the campaign’s messaging to be sent only to those who need-
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ed persuading, saving the campaign from wasting resources on voters already
likely to vote for Bush and those unlikely to do so (Ceaser, Busch 2001).
To create a database of voters, the Bush campaign used the Republican
National Committee’s (RNC) donor and volunteer lists as a starting point.
They hired the marketing research firm Axciom, which had lifestyle information on 95% of those in the RNC’s database, giving the Bush campaign information on approximately 5.7 to 6 million voters. Using this data, the campaign was able to call roughly 5,000 voters with a survey and ask questions
designed to find out which issues had the most traction with voters. Between
the data provided by Axciom and the survey, the campaign claimed the ability to predict voter behavior with 80-90% accuracy (Sosnik, et al 2006).
It is worth noting that the 2004 election cycle saw a vast majority of the
campaigns’ efforts focused on states generally perceived as “swing states,”
having awarded their electoral votes to each of the parties at some point in
the recent past. It is estimated that both the Bush and Kerry campaigns
spent an average of 8.7 million dollars on these 16 states alone, and did not
want to invest too heavily in states unlikely to change their voting preference, which were seen as “non-competitive.” This disparity between swing
states and non-competitive ones can also be seen in the amount of direct mail
received by residents. On average, those living in swing states received over
twice as many pieces of direct mail from campaigns as those living in noncompetitive ones. Both campaigns neglected targeting voters with inconsistent voting activity, targeting active voters more than seven times as much as
inactive. Similarly, voters in swing states received almost 11 times as many
door-to-door visits from a campaign as did those living in non-competitive
states (Sosnik, et al 2006).
It is important to note that the 2004 campaigns targeting efforts rarely
overlapped, even when the campaigns were discussing the same issue. Data
shows that while both the Kerry and Bush campaign sent out mailings concerning taxes, only 31% of those receiving mail on tax issues received mail
from both candidates. Of all the issues discussed, this percentage of overlap is
the highest, demonstrating that targeting on the same issue yielded vastly
different sets of voters for each campaign. This difference was a result of the
campaigns’ ability to recognize the voters most likely to vote for their candidate, and aiming to target only them. Furthermore, the Bush campaign
sought out people coded as “navigators,” who were most likely to discuss
Bush with family and friends. These people were considered to have the
greatest chance of winning votes for the President, and they were specially
targeted with emails and mailers encouraging them to discuss President
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Bush with others. Studies have also found that these people, considered influential in their communities, are more likely to have others ask them for
political advice than any other kind of advice. The Bush campaign is said to
have had a list of 7 million volunteers and 2 million navigators contacted by
the campaign (Sosnik, et al 2006).
Additionally, studies show that each campaign had a certain set of issues that it was most likely to advertise. For example, Kerry’s campaign was
almost four times as likely to campaign on health care issues as Bush’s, while
the Bush campaign was nine times more likely to address gay issues in its
advertisements. Bush’s opposition to gay marriage was generally referred to
within the context of “family” or “traditional” values. Additionally, Bush was
advised to frame his decision to invade Iraq as part of a larger “War on Terror,” as voters were mostly against the war. This framing connected the war
to values to which voters responded (Hillygus et al. 2008).
Studies have also found that contrary to conventional wisdom, both the
Kerry and Bush campaigns focused a majority of their targeted messaging on
wedge-issue voters rather than shoring up support within their base. These
voters are affiliated with a certain political party, but have demographic data
suggesting that they disagree with that party on at least one major issue. In
a majority of cases in 2004, messages were actually targeted to appeal to voters of the opposite party whose affiliation was not seen as especially strong.
Thus, the campaigns sought to use crucial issues as a way to break off parts
of the opposition’s base voting block (Hillygus et al. 2008). According to the
data, Bush’s campaign was much more effective at this than Kerry’s, as 11%
of Democrats voted for Bush, while only 6% of Republicans voted for Kerry.
Bush’s defection rate in this election marks one of the lowest in the age of
modern polling (Ceaser, Busch 136).
At the same time, both campaigns avoided touching on issues where the
public disagreed with their candidate. This was especially evident at the Democratic Convention during the 2004 cycle, where issues of gun control and
abortion were downplayed or not mentioned by major speakers. These were
issues where Bush’s stance was favored by the public, causing Kerry to avoid
campaigning heavily upon them in order to win over swing voters (Ceaser,
Busch 117).
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2008-Present: Social Networks and Advancing Technology
The 2008 presidential election is notable for the significant campaigning that
took place during the Democratic primaries. The two candidates consistently
winning these contests were Senators Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama.
For Senator Obama, the eventual victor of the primary and general elections
that year, the biggest challenge was proving that he had the experience for
the job of President. Luckily for the Obama campaign, the organization’s
polling showed that President Bush’s unpopularity caused a large amount of
voters to want a candidate promising change from the status quo. Due to this
unpopularity caused by a poor economy and dissatisfaction with the war in
Iraq, Obama’s team decided that the best way to sell the candidate was to
portray him as “not Bush” (Lizza 2008). During the primary season, this necessitated connecting Senator Clinton to President Bush as often as possible.
Adopting a slogan of “Change we can believe in,” Obama’s team painted him
as a Washington outsider running against a career politician who had voted
in favor of an unpopular war in Iraq. This framing of his perceived lack of experience allowed the campaign to turn his greatest weakness into a strength
(Lizza 2008).
Continuing into the general election, the Obama campaign once again
cast its opponent as a Washington insider with ties to President Bush. The
campaign’s initial concern about facing Senator John McCain in the general
election was based on his record in the Senate and a fear that voters would
identify him as a true moderate willing to buck the system. However, the
campaign’s top pollster demonstrated that the electorate defined McCain by
his statements during the Republican primaries, not by his history in the
Senate. This gave the Obama campaign the opportunity to define McCain as
they wished, opting once again to draw parallels between the opposition and
President George W. Bush (Lizza 2008). The Obama campaign tapped Senator Joe Biden as Obama’s running mate, hoping that this choice would address fears about Obama’s inexperience and compensate for his lack of foreign policy experience compared to McCain (Heilemann, Halperin 2010).
Discontent with outgoing President George W. Bush’s handling of the
economy and Iraq War meant that many states long seen as heavily Republican could possibly be in play during the 2008 presidential election. Ignoring
the commonly-held political wisdom that Southern states were guaranteed
Republican states, the Obama campaign expanded its operations into Virginia, North Carolina and Georgia. In order to win over previously Republican voters, the Obama campaign recognized the need for supportive voters to
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attest to the character of Senator Obama. To do this, they employed a strategy similar to the “navigators” employed by the Bush campaigns, locating
Obama supporters in the South who could convince voters hesitant to cast a
ballot for a Northern liberal politician. One field organizer in the region referred to these influential supporters as “character witnesses” (Fineman
2008). In the end, the campaign’s overall strategy appears to have been mostly successful, with both North Carolina and Virginia going for Barack Obama. This was the first time the latter had voted for a Democrat since 1964.
The Obama campaign’s expansion into these states was seen by many
analysts as a redrawing of the accepted political map, with some assuming
they would become swing states in future elections. Obama’s 2008 election
did bring with it some good demographic news for the Democrats. During
that election, Senator Obama won 66% of the votes cast by young adults,
while African-Americans and those of Hispanic background voted in larger
numbers than ever before. These three groups are statistically more likely to
vote Democratic, and their increased presence in the 2008 race was a significant factor in Obama’s victory, and attributed to their identifying with the
candidate due his ethnic background (Kiss 2008). Since this increase in minority turnout, voter identification legislation at the state level has come under scrutiny. Voter identification laws require that citizens present a stateissued identification card before being able to cast their ballots. Groups such
as the American Civil Liberties Union allege that these laws are meant to
discourage minority voting, as minorities would have less access to these
forms of identification (Prince 2014). They claim that Republican lawmakers
are using these laws to keep a large portion of the Democrats’ likely supporters from being able to vote. Despite these concerns, new voting laws drawing
complaints from outside groups continue to spread throughout states such as
Indiana and Ohio (American Civil Liberties Union 2014).
In addition to minority voters, young voters also received a great deal of
attention in 2008. Young voters were seen by the Obama camp as being highly targetable, and a strategy was crafted to ensure strong support from this
demographic. One part of this strategy was compiling a list of over three million cell phone numbers which were provided to the campaign consensually
by the owner. The campaign promised those who signed up that they would
receive campaign news via text message before the news was provided to the
media (Kiss 2008).
Additionally, online campaign presence saw a dramatic increase during
the 2008 election. A Pew Research Center study from that year found that
46% of Americans used e-mail, Internet, or text messages to gain knowledge
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of the presidential campaigns, discuss the election, or mobilize others to volunteer (Dutta et al. 2008). The Obama campaign appeared much more prepared to take advantage of this increase in Internet usage for political activity, focusing on their presence on social networking sites such as Facebook,
Twitter, and YouTube. During the primary, the campaign’s efforts led to a
lead in Facebook followers of 250,000 to Clinton’s 3,200. In the general election, Obama’s number of followers on the site rose to over 2 million, while the
number of Twitter followers reached 112,000. McCain’s Facebook profile saw
over 600,000 followers, with only 4,600 on Twitter. Obama’s YouTube profile
uploaded almost six times as many videos as McCain’s, and had almost four
times as many subscribers (Dutta et al. 2008).
This use of online social networking sites allowed supporters to easily
share campaign information and advertisements with their friends. The
Obama application for smartphones even allowed for the user to send out
messages supporting Obama to all of his or her contacts. For a candidate who
initially struggled with voters being unaware of his history, social networking
provided an easy and accessible platform to inform the public of Obama’s past
and credentials. While the Internet had been used in political campaigns before, the 2008 election marked the first time its primary use had been for
aims other than fundraising (Dutta et al. 2008).
Understanding the importance of voter turnout on Election Day, the
Obama campaign organized a state-of-the-art get-out-the-vote apparatus referred to as “Project Houdini.” Under this program, volunteers would be stationed at polling locations to check off targeted voters on a roster when they
came to the polls. Each of the voters on the roster for that precinct would be
assigned a four-digit code, which the volunteer would input into the campaign’s system via a hotline called throughout the day. The goal of this program was to give the campaign updates of who had voted in almost real-time,
keeping them from wasting resources calling or contacting those who had already voted. In practice, however, the influx of calls from volunteers was
enough to shut down the hotline. The failure of the automated system forced
volunteers to report the voter codes to local campaign offices, where the codes
were then entered into the system manually by another volunteer (Herbert
2008). Since this program was only used for precincts labeled high-priority,
the failure of the system did not completely derail the campaign’s efforts at
voter turnout (Jacobs 2012). Despite the crashing of the hotline, the Obama
campaign’s contacting was still more pervasive than McCain, with 28% of
voters claiming to have been contacted by the Obama campaign, while only
22% said the same of the McCain campaign (Herbert 2008).
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For the 2012 presidential election, the campaign of Republican candidate Mitt Romney recognized the need to compete with President Obama in
both online targeting of voters and get-out-the-vote operations on Election
Day. From 2008 to 2012, Americans continued to watch less live television,
choosing instead to watch programming in a variety ways, i.e. DVR. Some
estimates predicted that up to one-third of voters in 2012 did not see political
advertisements aired on television, with digital consumption of programming
beginning to act as a full substitute to live television rather than a supplement (Peters 2012).
During the month of April 2012, the Romney campaign created two different commercials which they had been airing on television in Wisconsin for
the primaries. One of the ads discussed Romney’s business background and
experience, making it a more positive political ad. The second one was a negative ad criticizing Senator Rick Santorum, an opponent in the Republican
primaries. Knowing that this ad would not be seen by almost a third of the
electorate, the Romney campaign began running polls in order to determine
which groups of voters were least likely to be watching live television. These
groups were then selected for online advertisements. Additional research
with the digital strategy firm Targeted Victory determined that the most persuadable group which was also the least likely to watch television was voters
over the age of 18 who were dissatisfied with the Obama administration and
tended to lean Republican (Peters 2012).
Adding to the complicated nature of online political advertising was the
fact that characteristics of likely Romney supporters varied by state as well.
In Michigan, for example, online users who frequented music sites to listen to
Christian music were much less likely to support Romney during the primary. The campaign assumed that these voters most likely supported Senator
Rick Santorum during the primary contests. This meant that advertising on
those sites did not feature Romney’s ad criticizing Santorum, as that message
was likely to be poorly received. Instead, these users would see the ad discussing Romney’s business experience (Peters 2012). This strategy for picking
messaging based on an Internet user’s lifestyle data would continue into the
general election.
With the McCain campaign focusing little on online interaction during
the 2008 contest, the Romney campaign had little information regarding
what online behaviors would reflect a stronger likelihood of leaning Republican. Thus, its online advertisements were created to collect data on those individuals who interacted with it. The advertisements contained a video which
would start playing after the user hovered the cursor over the advertisement
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for three seconds. Using this technology, the campaign gathered information
on not only who was initiating the playing of the video, but also how long he
or she watched and whether the user clicked for further information. After
cross-referencing this interaction with the personal data collected on the voters, the campaign determined several characteristics which made an online
user more likely to vote Republican. According to this information, these voters like to take online quizzes concerning news and entertainment, share
photographs, and are interested in technology, home repair, child care, and
literature (Peters 2012). Voters less likely to vote Republican were those interested in video and casino games, martial arts, jazz, and bowling (Peters
2012).
The e-mails sent by the Obama campaign during the 2012 election were
also able to track similar data as the Romney campaign’s advertisements.
The Obama campaign was able to see who had opened a particular campaign
e-mail and when. They were also able to track which links within the body of
an e-mail were clicked by a given recipient. The campaign would use this
data to judge a voter’s interest in learning more about President Obama and
his platform. It would then send fewer e-mails to those consistently not engaging with the correspondence (Peters 2012).
When it came to microtargeting voters, the Obama campaign in 2012
sought to fix some of the problems which had plagued the 2008 campaign’s
efforts to microtarget online. During that previous election, Obama’s online
messaging was not refined for each voter based on data collected about him
or her, while direct mailings were. This was due to the campaign’s inability to
combine the e-mail addresses provided to the campaign with the existing voter profiles used for microtargeting. Thus, e-mails from that campaign had
stuck with general messaging on popular issues (Peters 2012).
For the 2012 campaign, the Obama campaign launched Project Narwhal, a sophisticated system designed to link a voter’s online habits and contact information with the rest of the microtargeting data compiled on him or
her. The campaign would then be able to personalize messaging to each voter
through not only direct mailing, but also through e-mails dealing with specific issues. The accumulation of this massive amount of data in one single system allowed for easy use in every part of the campaign, whereas previous
campaigns had stored it across multiple servers necessitating physically
transferring data from one to another (Issenberg 2012).
While the Romney campaign certainly targeted voters based on their
voter profiles, as demonstrated by the use of specific ads in the Wisconsin
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primary, it labeled its Election Day turnout project as its secret weapon, and
as its answer to the Obama campaign’s Project Narwhal. In fact, the name
ORCA was chosen due to the Orca being the primary predator of the Narwhal
(Jacobs 2012). Despite Project ORCA being billed as the Romney campaign’s
response to Project Narwhal, its aim was much more in line with what Obama had tried in 2008 with Project Houdini. The program would allow for pollwatchers to log in real-time which voters had already cast their ballots via an
application or website for phones. This focus primarily on Election Day
turnout left Romney incredibly vulnerable to technological glitches derailing
the largest part of his strategy. When Election Day came, the system crashed,
causing the campaign to fly blind throughout the entirety of the voting
process. Ironically, this was the same issue which derailed the Obama campaign’s Project Houdini. Obama campaign officials stated that the failures of
Houdini in 2008 had demonstrated that the technology was not yet ready for
use on such a large scale, which ORCA’s failure only further proved (Jacobs
2012).
The failure of ORCA meant that the Romney Campaign had almost no
idea which voters had cast a ballot, and which likely Romney supporters still
needed to be contacted in order to ensure voting. The 2012 Obama campaign
developed a new project to log voter contact on Election Day. Project Gordon,
named after the man credited with killing Houdini, used smartphone reporting instead of phone calls to allow for faster reporting of data. The 2012 campaign, however, did not make a centerpiece of their strategy as they had in
2008, as they were wary of the possibility of crashes, such as the ones experienced by Project Houdini and Project ORCA. There have been no reports of
Project Gordon crashing on Election Day 2012, but its limited use and scope
during that campaign makes it difficult to judge its effectiveness (Jacobs
2012).
Following the surge in popularity of social networking sites, the 2008
and 2012 campaigns began to use these mediums to more easily target voters
based upon their web usage information. Starting with the 2008 election,
Facebook, the world’s most popular social networking site, began to allow political firms access to users’ profile data to help facilitate targeted advertisements. The Obama campaign, in particular, made effective use of this, hoping
to engage young voters (Dutta, Fraser 2008). In the 2012 Republican primary, Representative Michelle Bachmann’s campaign used this Facebook information to advertise to those who “liked” Christian rock artists on the site,
claimed to like the Tea Party, or who had posted a status about favoring tax
cuts. The hope was that Facebook users falling into these categories would be
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more receptive to Representative Bachmann’s conservative stances (Dwoskin
2014).
Twitter, another popular social networking site, has also seen a large
amount of political use since 2008. During the 2012 presidential campaign,
Twitter saw 10 million tweets during the first presidential debate and 20 million on Election Day (Zhang, Seltzer, Bichard 2013). These numbers suggest
that voters are increasingly turning to the Internet to voice their political affiliations and interactions, making it a prime medium for political campaigns.
Due to the relatively new nature of this political adoption of social networking sites, political scientists are still unsure of the actual effects they have on
voters. One of the leading criticisms of political activity on social networking
sites is that the overwhelming amount of data available to voters forces them
to seek out information which reinforces already-held positions. If true, this
would imply that campaign targeting on the Internet is ineffective as the
users will only seek out candidates with whom they already agree.
Due to the increasing importance of the Internet as a campaign platform, its effectiveness in winning over new voters remains crucial. One of the
more recent studies in the field has aimed to answer questions concerning
social networking sites and political behavior, offering both hope and caution
for campaigns’ use of these platforms. The study took place during the 2012
presidential election and included a large amount of social media content
from both parties. This study found that engaging in political activities on
social networking sites had a positive relation to offline political involvement.
However, the same study also found that only the social networking site
Facebook saw a positive relationship between use and increased political interest (Zhang, Seltzer, Bichard 2013).
This same study also researched the extent to which social networking
sites encouraged selective exposure and avoidance of political information.
Facebook and Twitter were found to have a positive relationship with users
selectively seeking out information aligning with previously-held beliefs. This
would imply that campaigns’ social media presence is being primarily accessed by those already likely to vote for a candidate. The study did, however,
find no positive relationship between the use of a social networking site and
the selective avoidance of information contradicting one’s political beliefs.
This is slightly encouraging for campaigns, as it means that while undecided
voters are unlikely to seek out a candidate’s social media presence, they will
also not attempt to avoid anything that may happen to be presented to them
(Zhang, Seltzer, Bichard 2013). Finally, this study found that only YouTube
usage had a positive relationship with strong party affiliation (Zhang,
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Seltzer, Bichard 2013). The reasons for this connection are not examined and
I was unable to find other studies explaining this link.
Researchers have found that campaigns’ use of social networking sites
do not have a significant influence on persuading voters to change their
minds about certain issues. One study found that less than half of all users
follow officials who hold viewpoints opposing their own, leading to a lack of
access to opposing ideas. Additionally, that study suggested that users confronted with information opposing their viewpoints are likely to seek out data
that rebuts the claim and are uninterested in fully considering or adopting
that information. This finding undermines campaigns’ recent forays into using social networking sites and online presence to find persuadable voters
(Johnson, Zhang, Bichard 2011).
Analysis and Predictions
The 2012 presidential campaigns featured a variety of microtargeting tactics
first established during the 2004 election, but also introduced new trends into
the election process. While some of these tactics failed to garner the desired
response, others have the ability to further influence the ways in which campaigns interact with the American electorate. Voter turnout operations and
online campaigning fall into the latter category.
The move towards campaigning on social media sites began during the
2008 Democratic primaries. Since then, campaigns have continued to encourage further online activity and outreach, using it to campaign and organize
volunteers for events. Campaigns have pointed to the decrease in American
television consumption as a reason to eliminate some television advertising
in favor of online messaging. By some estimates, a third of potential viewers
of political television commercials in 2008 would not see any in 2012, demonstrating the increasing substitution of the Internet for television (Peters
2012). Thus, it would appear that turning to online messaging would allow
campaigns to fully access those voters who have left the television-watching
demographic.
Unfortunately for political campaigns, the studies cited in this work
have demonstrated many of challenges facing advertising efforts on social
media and the Internet in general. Internet advertisements suffer from low
rates of interaction, with between 1 in 500 and 1 in 1,000 online advertisements being clicked on by a user (Rampell 2014). Additionally, users of social
networking sites have been found to selectively avoid following online profiles
of elected officials with differing viewpoints, preventing campaigns from
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reaching most of the voters who are not already supportive of the candidate
(Johnson, Zhang, Bichard 2011). These findings indicate that online campaign advertising is reaching far fewer individuals than previous television
ads in the past and that campaigns’ advertising on social networking sites
should encourage get-out-the-vote efforts from likely voters, not persuading
wedge-issue voters.
Online messaging is almost exclusively effective only if the recipient already supports the candidate and no positive connection has been found between the use of social networking sites and political interest, nor party affiliation. (Zhang, Seltzer, Bichard 2013). Since 2004, campaigns have used microtargeting to find likely supporters and wedge-issue voters, but the data on
online messaging suggests this trend will soon fade. As campaigns escalate
their use of Internet contact and social networking sites, their work will focus
on identifying likely supporters and shifting away from the intense focus on
wedge-issue voters. (Peters 2012).
Increased targeting of likely supporters indicates a shift toward campaigns that will aim to mobilize their base in any given election. When the
2004 and 2008 campaigns targeted both likely supporters and wedge-issue
voters, voter turnout during the presidential elections increased over the previous cycle. In 2012, with the increased emphasis on online messaging, voter
turnout fell, marking the first presidential election drop-off in voter turnout
in three cycles (McDonald 2013). While this change in messaging can hardly
account for the entirety of that drop, the implications of this shift suggest it is
a contributing factor to some degree.
Another trend worth noting is the use of voter turnout programs on
Election Day. Despite Project Houdini’s failure in 2008, both Romney and
Obama crafted new systems focused on voter tracking during the 2012 race.
This suggests that political campaign operatives do not see voter turnout
tracking as an ephemeral trend, but as a crucial part of future electoral
strategy. Early voting has become more popular in recent elections, facilitating larger turnout among minority voters. Efforts by Republican lawmakers
in states such as Ohio to limit this early voting have drawn accusations of
voter suppression, claiming that the laws are intended to keep Democrats
from capitalizing on their advantage with minority groups. Despite these attempts to limit early voting, it appears campaigns are still preparing for continued expansion of early voting programs, as indicated by continued development of voter tracking systems (Prince 2014). As the voting period is extended, campaigns will require a running estimate of how many votes a can-

17

BUTLER JOURNAL OF UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH, VOLUME 1

didate has received at any given time to increase the efficiency of voter contact.
Finally, the increase in the amount of personal data available to campaigns is likely to continue unabated as voters increase their online activity.
Sites of all kinds have begun to notice the profitability of collecting and selling user data to campaigns and marketing firms, even if their content seems
unrelated to politics. The online music site Pandora recently announced that
it would begin tracking which music was being listened to in a certain area
and compare that data to the area’s electoral turnout. The site hopes to determine which musical artists and styles indicate a Republican or Democratic
leanings. The site would be able to sell this information to campaigns and political organizations to be used in online microtargeting efforts (Dwoskin
2014).
This trend in the availability of personal information shows no signs of
slowing down. National parties will surely continue to pass along existing
voter profiles to their presidential candidates so campaigns don’t have to
start from scratch. Despite the increase in available data, studies suggest
that campaigns are targeting fewer voters on fewer issues. Microtargeting,
despite being credited with several major electoral wins, seems to have
turned the corner on its ability to target the right kinds of voters voters as
campaigns move online. The possibility that American presidential campaigns have reached a point where their tactics are limiting the size and ideological diversity of the electorate is alarming, especially when voters’ personal data is more accessible than ever. While the decline in voter turnout in
2012 was due to a host of factors, my findings suggest that campaign tactics
played a role. A vibrant democracy requires that citizens remain highly informed and that they voice their opinions through voting. If the trends suggested by this research continue, campaigns’ tactics will be working against
those very goals. Such tactics may work well in achieving electoral victory,
but will ultimately lead to the undermining of American democracy.
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